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 
Abstract— In this paper, we explore the formation of network 
relationships among disaster relief agencies during the process 
of responding to an unexpected event. The relationship is 
investigated through variables derived from the policy network 
theory, and four cases from three developed countries such as (i) 
Hurricane Katrina in the US; (ii) Typhoon Maemi in South 
Korea; (iii) Kobe; and, (iv) Tohoku Earthquake in Japan that 
failed to cope with extreme events forms the basis for case study 
presented here. We argue that structural characteristics of 
multi-jurisdictional coordination may facilitate or impede in 
responding to a complex nature of today’s disaster. We further 
highlight the promise of policy network approach in facilitating 
the development of multi-jurisdictional coordination process 
which may provide new avenue to improve the communication 
and coordination of hierarchical command control driven 
organizations with the local community. Our proposed novel 
approach in investigating the usefulness of network approach   
through media content analysis for emergency may provide 
opportunity as a countermeasure to a traditional hierarchical 
coordination, which may give further insights in establishing a 
more effective network for emergency. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Research in disaster management puts primary effort on 
the government organizations due to the availability of 
extensive resources, physical forcing, and the legal authority, 
which may contend with disasters. In disaster response, 
however, the government sector alone cannot respond 
effectively and timely during emergency. The changes in 
social structure, the role change of government organizations, 
and diverse aspects of a disaster cause the limitations. As a 
result, the private sector’s participation, such as NGOs and 
private organizations as well as community based volunteer 
organizations, has been seen increasingly important in 
disaster response management. Furthermore, the transition to 
the network approach is often raised to be needed due to the 
nature of a disaster management system in the traditional 
bureaucratic approach. “A long tradition of bureaucratic 
approach is slowly surrendering” as Taylor [1] addresses, and 
a network approach  [2, 3] is suggested as a possible 
breakthrough as a means to tackle problems in disaster 
management [4].  
In particular, we utilize a policy network approach to 
examine the dynamic features of responding participants and 
policy making inclusive of policy implementation during a 
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disaster response phase. For the initial exploration, network 
variables are drawn from the policy network theory to 
understand the features of participants with a focus on 
relationships between them. These variables are examined 
with media content analysis.  
This paper begins with a research question, “How does a 
policy network perform in the process of a disaster 
response?” We look for the difference from network 
components (network variables in details) in policy network 
theory and network types following disaster response 
management systems to tackle the question. The following 
questions are derived from the research question:  
1. Who are the participating actors for a disaster 
management system during a disaster response?  
2. Who does play a central role to coordinate activities 
among participating actors? 
3. What are the relationships in the network among 
participating actors?  
4. Is the network opened or closed? and, What is or are the 
inherent benefits of open, close or a hybrid coordinating 
structure in providing effective and timely response? 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes 
a policy network approach with types and components, and 
presents a conceptual framework; Section 3 observes a 
research approach in disaster management. A framework of 
case study and data collection are examined; Section 4 
investigates network variables for each case, i.e., Katrina, 
Maemi, Kobe, and Tohoku; Section 5 presents implications of 
the analysis results and recommends a desirable network 
model for emergency. 
II. POLICY NETWORK THEORY 
The term policy network is used to examine and analyze 
the behaviours and interactions among actors (i.e., 
participants) [5]. Policy network has won recognition of 
analyzing structural relations among participants in policy 
process [6]. Under rigid hierarchy, it is difficult to take an 
appropriate response to a fast-paced environment, and 
researchers who experienced the limitations from hierarchical 
bureaucratic government pay attention to policy network as a 
new approach. Yet, empirical studies on policy network that 
examine the behaviours and interactions of participants in 
disaster management are rarely found [5, 7, 8]. 
Rhodes [9] suggests that the policy network as a 
comprehensive concept, which is arranged on the various 
types of network and classifies the policy networks into five 
kinds: (i) policy/territorial community with the closed form of 
the type of policy networks; (ii) professional network with 
professional groups exercising a dominant influence; (iii) 
inter-governmental network with the central government and 
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local governments regarding the relations; (iv) producer 
network with the economic group having a dominant 
influence; and, (v) issue network with more openness. These 
are classified “ranging along a continuum from highly 
integrated policy communities to loosely integrated issue 
networks” and “according to their membership composition, 
the extent of interdependence between their members, and the 
distribution of resources between members.” [10]    
TABLE I. COMPONENTS AND VARIABLES OF POLICY NETWORK 
FOR THE CURRENT STUDY 
Components Variables Description 
Participants Actors The government 
sector, the 
private sector 
Attitude Is the behaviour 
active or 
passive? 
Motivation Existence of 
incentive 
Relationships Interaction Frequency Whether 
relationship is 
formed and 
whether 
participants 
have a contact, 
such as a 
meeting 
  Direction One-sided or 
mutual 
Network 
Structure 
Interdependence Cooperative or 
conflictive 
Exclusion Is the network 
open or closed 
to participants? 
 
Recent studies tend to analyze policy network with adding 
or subtracting of the components developed from the Rhodes’ 
model and  reported in Marsh and Rhodes [11] [5, 10]. 
Furthermore, to understand the dynamics of policy network, 
it is helpful to explore definition of the term ‘policy network’ 
is. Montpetit [6] states and Lee and Park [5] rephrase the 
term, the policy network refers to the relationships among 
participants (or actors) through the policy making process. 
Thus, in this study, these two concepts are centered and 
considered for the selection of components of policy network 
with Rhodes’ model [11] as a basic foundation. 
   As for participants, Lee and Park [5] states that participants 
are groups or individuals who take part in the policy making 
process to accomplish the common goal. This component, 
participants, has three subcomponents which can be measured 
by the number of participants and the nature of the 
participants, such as attitudes and motivation for participation 
[5, 12]. Israel and Rounds [13] highlights the size of number 
of participants who involved in the network to measure as a 
component for analysis. The component is examined from the 
perspective of the group unit in this study. 
   As for relationships, interaction and a type of relationships 
are needed to be considered to understand the notion of the 
policy network [5]. Firstly, interaction means a substantial 
process that resources are exchanged and mobilized to make 
the common goal real [14]. To measure this component 
interaction, the frequency of interactions and the direction of 
relationships are used and examined as subcomponents in the 
policy network [5]. Mitchell [15] and Israel and Rounds [13] 
describe the interaction as an analysis component to examine 
the frequency and the reciprocity among participants. 
Secondly, a type of relationships refers to the network 
structure between participants which has an influence on 
outcomes [16, 17]. Yishai [18] addresses the five types of 
policy network are distinguished by two variables
1
; 
interdependence relating to relationships between participants, 
and exclusion pertaining to the degree of openness to new 
participants.  To measure this component network structure, 
two variables are suggested in Lee and Park [5]: (i) whether 
relationships between participants are cooperative or 
conflictive; and, (ii) whether it is easy for new participants to 
take part in and withdraw from a network structure. Kim 
argues [19] that the basic element of the network is the 
relationship among social components because the network 
changes by the relationships that actors form. In addition, 
Mitchell [15] considers the network structure as a component 
for analysis. TABLE I shows the components and variables of 
policy network considered in previous literature and used for 
analysis in this study. 
 
Figure 1. A conceptual framework 
In order to explore the dynamics of policy network, it is 
important to investigate the components constituting the 
policy network. As for the selection of the components, this 
study follows the same route as the previous studies. As 
observed from above, there are various components used in 
previous literature to conduct an analysis and it is found that 
they tend to form the components from the basis of Rhode’s 
model [3] as Lee and Park [5] addresses in their recent work 
on policy networks in disaster management. The commonly 
used components of policy network proposed from the recent 
 
1  In this paper, the term “subcomponent” is replaced with the term 
“variable” as used in [18] to measure the components of the policy network 
for analysis. 
  
studies are chosen for this study. Fig. 1 shows the conceptual 
framework for this study. 
Disaster management in each country has been formed 
differently in terms of an institution. Due to these different 
institutional backgrounds, we argue that components of policy 
network may work differently, and that a different type of 
policy network may be formed under the influence of them. 
The type of policy network may have an effect on a difference 
appearing in responding to a disaster. A desirable network in 
disaster management responding effectively to disasters will 
be discussed. By comparing the four cases in three countries, 
the difference of network components and network types will 
be driven. A research approach in disaster management is 
observed in the following section. 
III. RESEARCH APPROACH 
It is important to understand why the networks differ in 
various contexts during disaster response. In order to examine 
this process of network formation among participants, three 
countries among well-developed countries in terms of 
disaster management that failed to cope with the latest 
extreme emergencies are selected for this paper [20, 21]. In 
order to compare disasters in the U.S., Korea, and Japan, the 
following cases are chosen for the study: Hurricane Katrina in 
the U.S. in 2005, Typhoon Maemi in Korea in 2003, the Kobe 
earthquake in the southern part of Hyogo Prefecture, Japan 
1995, and the Tohoku earthquake in Japan in 2011.  
   Content analysis has been used in various fields, such as 
sociology, communication, and journalism for more than five 
decades [22]. In particular, researchers in sociology, such as 
Max Weber, have had interests in media content since the 
early 20
th
 century to measure the “cultural temperature of 
society” [23]. Media content analysis has become gradually 
prevalent as a research method during the 1920s and the 1930s 
[24]. Afterwards, it has been primarily used as a quantitative 
research method which coded text of content data  into clear 
categories, and then described by using statistics [25]. In order 
to code a text or set of texts during content analysis, there are a 
number of choices (or eight category coding steps) needed to 
be made, such as level of analysis and generalization. These 
choices are important not only these are being made due to 
“potential methodological bias but also because such choices 
require semantic interpretations of the data” [26]. These steps 
affect results received and the interpretation of results adapted 
from Carley [27]. TABLE II shows codes for content analysis. 
There are seven themes for three categories. 
In the category of participants: first, the theme actors means 
that how many organizations take part and which 
organizations play a principal role in a response phase; 
second, attitude implies whether the behaviour of responding 
organizations is active or passive; third, motivation refers to 
whether there is any incentive to encourage organizations to 
coordinate and participate.  
In the category of interaction: first, frequency is related to 
how participating organizations communicate or have a 
contact to exchange information vital for  coordinating 
response actions; second, direction means that whether the 
exchange of resource, such as personnel and equipment 
among participants is one-sided or dyadic.  
In the category of network structure: first, interdependence 
refers to whether the relationships between participants is 
cooperative or conflictive; second, exclusion means whether 
the access of new participants to resources for disaster relief 
actions is easy or whether the access of news participants to 
the network structure is easy to participate in or withdraw 
from.    
TABLE II. CODES DEVELOPED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Category Theme Code Sub Code 
Participants Actors ACTS ACTS_CTGOV 
ACTS_LCGOV 
ACTS_PRV 
Attitude ATTD ATTD_ACT 
ATTD_PAS 
Motivation MTVN MTVN_POS 
MTVN_NEG 
Interaction Frequency FREQ N/A 
Direction DRCN DRCN_ONE 
DRCN_DYD 
Network 
Structure 
Interdependence INTD INTD_COOP 
INTD_CONF 
Exclusion EXCL EXCL_OPN 
EXCL_CLS 
Notes: ACTS_CTGOV(Actors_CentralGovt), _LCGOV(LocalGovt), 
_PRV(PrivateSector), ATTD_ACT(Attitude_Active), _PAS(Passive), 
MTVN_POS(Motivation_Positive), _NEG(Negative), 
DRCN_ONE(Direction_Onesided), _DYD(Dyadic), 
INTD_COOP(Interdependence_Cooperative), _CONF(Conflictive), 
EXCL_OPEN(Exclusion_Open), _CLS(Closed)  
Coding category in TABLE II reflects interpretations of 
disaster management in responding to an extreme event. An 
initial pilot run for a coder training and a test of reliability was 
conducted. The coding instruments and procedures were 
sophisticated as well through the initial run. In particular, to 
establish reliability of coding, a coder was asked to conduct 
coding for sample contexts excerpted randomly. Afterwards, 
the both results were examined for the portions of the coding 
and agreed with little ambiguity. In order to reduce bias in the 
study and to keep it objective, a senior researcher who was 
not familiar with the four cases was involved in early 
analysis. 
   This paper uses various media data from The New York 
Times, Associated Press, Cable News Network (CNN), 
Munwha Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC), Korean 
Broadcasting System (KBS), Seoul Broadcasting System 
(SBS), Chosun Ilbo, Yonhap Television News (YTN), Donga 
Ilbo, Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), Fuji TV, TV Asahi, 
Washington Post, Japanese Weekly Magazine, The Sankei 
Shimbun. Number of articles identified for the analysis in each 
case: 18 for Katrina; 16 for Maemi; 17 for Kobe; 20 for 
Tohoku. 
  
IV. MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 
For each case, this study examines network components 
derived from the reviews of literature, which enables to 
understand [1] who are the participating actors for a disaster 
management systems during a disaster response? and, who 
plays a key role to coordinate activities among actors?, [2] 
what are the relationships in the network among actors? [3] is 
the network opened or closed? and, What is or are the inherent 
benefits of open, close or a hybrid coordinating structure in 
providing effective and timely response? 
A. Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina was considered just as one of the 
tropical storms at the beginning on August 23, 2005 [28]. 
This tropical storm, however, grew into a disastrous hurricane 
over the next seven days. All the citizens in the US did not 
think the tropical storm seriously and watched with a 
curiosity, but soon it turned into deep concern. American 
citizens held the awes for the unbelievable ferocity of the 
catastrophic event and became disappointed and frustrated at 
the incompetency of the government sector to respond 
effectively [29]. Even though Hurricane Katrina was one of 
the most predictable natural disaster in US history, the 
authorities failed to manage to respond effectively to the 
crisis [30, 31]. In due consideration of hurricane occurrences 
and accuracy in predictions, this was not common in the US 
[32]. Katrina and the following flooding disclosed 
momentous defects in the government sector – Federal, State, 
and local – for responding to catastrophic events [29]. 
Hurricane Katrina showed  the world how susceptible the US 
can be to natural disasters and it was recorded as one of the 
most expensive natural disasters in US history [33]. 
 
B. Typhoon Maemi 
Super Typhoon Maemi, the strongest one ever since records 
began nearly 100 years in Korea, hit the southern coastal 
region with a category 4 on the 12
th
 of September in 2003. The 
typhoon ravaged the south part of Korea with the atrocious 
wind reaching up to 216 kph and 450 mm of precipitation, 
which consequently caused the tragic loss of more than 117 
lives and 25,000 people homeless [34]. Since the track of 
Typhoon Maemi was closer to industrial areas, it brought huge 
damage in industrial infrastructure as a result. Even though 
there was harsh criticism of the slow disaster response from 
the Korean government during and after Rusa in 2002, the 
authorities did not seem to learn any lessons from their past 
mistakes. Furthermore, they did not carry out effective disaster 
relief measures, such as evacuation operations, when Maemi 
made landfall one year later. 
C. Kobe Earthquake 
The Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake commonly referred to 
as the Kobe earthquake because it struck the Kobe region 
(henceforth called the Kobe earthquake), shook Japan at 
5:46am on 17 January 1995 with a magnitude 7.2 on the 
Richter scale and a depth of 13.2km. The strong quake 
ravaged densely populated regions, leaving many casualties 
and immense property damage [35]. Even though Japan often 
experienced many earthquakes with a various size of a 
magnitude and was well prepared, it was a great shock even to 
the well experienced country with this size of a magnitude in 
1995 [36]. There was no such a destructive quake which shook 
Japan in the 20
th
 century except for the great Kanto earthquake 
that devastated wide regions of Tokyo and Yokohama, leaving 
143,000 casualties in 1923 [37]. 
D. Tohoku Earthquake 
The East Japan Great Earthquake or The 2011 off the 
Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake (for simplicity, 
henceforth called the Tohoku earthquake) named by the 
Japan Meteorological Agency occurred off the Sanriku coast 
of the Tohoku region at 2:46 pm. (Japan Standard Time) on 
11 March 2011 with a magnitude 9.0 on the Richter scale 
[38]. A massive tsunami over 10m high induced by the quake 
struck the north-eastern part of Japan. In addition to the initial 
colossal earthquake and the subsequent tsunami, the nuclear 
power stations in Fukushima Prefecture which were the major 
source of electrical energy for the Kanto region were 
seriously damaged in consequence of the massive hit from the 
tsunami [39-41]. In particular, the threat coming from the 
consequences of the meltdown is still real and ongoing more 
than two years after the horrifying incident as of May 2013 
[42]. The triple disaster left 15,797 people died with 3,054 
missing as of April 2012 and caused the estimated damage 
amounted to the tens of billions US dollars  [40, 43].  
 
E. Frequency of Codes 
TABLE III. FREQUENCY OF CODES IN MEDIA SOURCES  
(sub) Codes 
Katrina Maemi Kobe Tohoku 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
ACT_CTGOV 
ACT_LCGOV 
ACTS_PRV 
68 61 44 52 72 41 92 58 
34 30 18 21 64 36 34 21 
10 9 22 26 40 23 34 21 
ATTD_ACT 
ATTD_PAS 
18 39 12 31 4 20 6 20 
28 61 26 68 16 80 24 80 
MTVN_POS 
MTVN_NEG 
8 10 2 12 8 10 20 17 
76 90 14 88 72 90 96 83 
FREQ 24 n/a 2 n/a 16 n/a 6 n/a 
DRCN_ONE 
DRCN_DYD 
18 90 6 75 20 71 30 88 
2 10 2 25 8 29 4 12 
INTD_COOP 
INTD_CONF 
4 15 2 50 16 67 6 33 
22 85 2 50 8 33 12 67 
EXCL_OPN 
EXCL_CLS 
6 23 2 25 0 0 14 100 
20 77 6 75 12 100 0 0 
Content analysis is done manually and every data source is 
examined line by line. Rather than just presenting the 
frequency of words within a text, this study focuses on each 
concept for content analysis as a more sophisticated analysis 
as Pool [44] underlines in the book titled, ‘Trends in content 
analysis’. The frequency of a certain concept in a text is 
counted and calculated on the basis of its code in the end. 
  
Concepts and codes developed in the previous section are 
used for content analysis. 
TABLE III presents the frequency and percentage of the 
codes (sub codes) that are counted and accumulated one by 
one through examining the media sources. Each percentage is 
only applied among codes of the same theme. As for 
percentage of Actors, for example, 61% for ACTS_CTGOV 
of Katrina in the following table means that it takes up 61% 
out of the entire sum for the theme Actors. 
 
F.Content Anaysis 
In this paper, we utilized the policy network to examine the 
dynamic features of responding participants and policy 
making inclusive of policy implementation. Network 
variables were drawn from the policy network theory to 
understand the features of participants with a focus on 
relationships between them. These variables were examined 
with media content analysis. In this section, we compare the 
four disaster cases and examine the findings discovered in the 
previous section 4 by looking at data in divergent ways.  
   In particular, two approaches are utilized to go beyond 
the initial impressions and derive a new concept by looking 
for each case’s similarities with intergroup differences. A first 
approach suggested by Eisenhardt [45] is to search for 
patterns. This approach selects categories first, and then looks 
for within-group similarities with intergroup differences 
afterwards. A second approach is for selecting pairs of cases, 
and then for listing the similarities and differences between 
each pair. This approach helps investigators look for the 
delicate similarities and differences between cases. That is to 
say, a search for similarities from a seemingly different pair 
can provide researchers with more matured understanding 
and in the same manner, a search for differences from 
seemingly similar cases by researchers can give an 
opportunity to break simplistic frames for sophisticated 
understanding. The result gained after these comparisons can 
be used as new categories and concepts that researchers never 
expected beforehand. Grouping cases into threes or fours for 
comparison is an extension of this approach [45]. 
 
A. Approach One 
With the first approach, we particularly examine the 
relationships among joining participants with the central 
government centered on as shown in Fig. 2.  
 
Figure 2. Approach One:  
Relationships with the central government being centered 
 
For this approach, four themes in each case are selected; 
actors, attitude, direction, and exclusion. As for the code 
actors, the number of participants interacting in response 
operations and which organizations respond first are 
observed. For attitude, whether central governments (e.g., the 
federal government in the US) support the first responders 
active to respond effectively to the crisis is examined. As 
scholars [46, 47] argue that all emergency management 
systems today are modelled on a bureaucratic approach with 
each case may have one-sided relationships with outer actors 
(or new actors joining in) in common in terms of sharing 
information and resources. Thus, direction and exclusion 
from two categories – interaction and network structure - are 
considered for investigating whether the direction of resource 
is one-sided or dyadic, and whether network structure is 
opened or closed. 
 
 
Figure 3. Vertical cylinder graphs presenting the proportions of the selected 
categories for the first approach of cross-case analysis 
As depicted in Fig. 3, all four cases have similarity and 
difference each other; (1) it is clear that there is a similar 
pattern found in two concepts, i.e. Attitude and Direction, (2) 
and from the last concept, i.e. Exclusion, there is a different 
pattern shown, in particular, from the two cases, Kobe and 
Tohoku.  
   As for a similar pattern, two concepts appeared in having a 
similarity for four cases. First, while the proportion of an 
active attitude among responding participants for each case is 
accounting for a relatively small ratio, between 20% and 
39%, the passive attitude of participants in an unpredicted 
event has a much higher proportion, from 61% to 80%. Most 
of passive attitude was from the government sector and 
attitude of the private sector was active and swift in action in 
most cases. In particular, it is interesting that the results of the 
two Japanese cases for the active attitude and the passive 
attitude are exactly the same, 20% for active and 80% for 
passive. It is obvious that there is no change at least in the 
attitude among participants between the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. Second, the 
proportion of the one-sided direction in exchanging 
information inclusive of resource is accounting for a great 
amount, from 71% to 90%, in marked contrast to the 
proportion, between 10% and 29%, of the dyadic direction in 
information exchange. This result presents that each disaster 
response system has a strong tendency in conveying 
information and resource one sided rather than dyadic 
  
between the responding participants, which proves that all 
disaster response systems today are modelled on a 
bureaucratic approach with one-way relationships in terms of 
sharing information and resource, as scholars argue [46, 47]. 
As for the proportion of direction in Japanese cases, it is 
interesting that the one-sided direction ratio increased by 17% 
from 71% for the Kobe case to 88% for the Tohoku case, after 
considering all of those reports praising the lessons the 
Japanese government learned since the Kobe temblor. This 
may be explained by the authorities trying to conceal or 
downplay the facts of the severity of the nuclear power plants 
in. Rather than telling the truth and sharing information, the 
government was busy hiding the critical information, such as 
meltdown in the plants and the level of evacuation.  
   The first two cases from concept exclusion, account for the 
almost same proportion, 23% and 25% for a closed network, 
and 77% and 75% for an opened network. However, for two 
Japanese cases, there is an ultimate difference in each 
concept, between 0% and 100%. This is the most notable 
difference among other concepts and proposes a big change in 
a network structure between the government sector and the 
private sector showing Japanese authorities have the 
possibility of learning in a disaster response system which can 
respond in an effective manner. 
 
B. Approach Two 
As for the second approach, four cases are separated into 
two groups and this classification is made by whether disaster 
management systems considering local governments as first 
responders with help from the private sector are established. 
Approach two analysis focuses more on two paired cases with 
similarities and differences.  
 
 
Figure 4. Approach Two:  
Relationships with the local governments being centered 
 
As for grouping, Japanese cases are divided into two 
different groups. The U.S. and Japan are evaluated as a 
country where local governments take the first responsibility 
to respond and cope with central government and the private 
sector [29, 48]. In case of Kobe, however, rather negative 
evaluations of government performance have centered around 
delays in the mobilization of critical resources and the 
initiation of key response tasks [49]. In case of Maemi, Korea 
did not have disaster management systems with the adjusted 
roles between central government and local governments to 
cope with the disaster effectively [50]. Thus, the Kobe case is 
coupled with the case of Maemi and the other two cases – 
Katrina and Tohoku - form a group.   
   While the group 1 consists of Katrina and Tohoku, group 
2 is composed of Maemi and Kobe. The classification is 
based on whether a disaster management system urging the 
importance of the local government’s role has been set up 
prior to a certain disaster or not. Firstly, as for the Katrina 
case, the U.S. had an integrated management system based on 
FEMA and enacted laws for local governments to respond 
first in case of emergency and other government agencies 
were supposed to support them if a scale of a disaster is large. 
Secondly, for the case of Maemi, it was arranged for local 
governments to respond first, but it was not long after the 
local self-government system was put into practice and the 
system was not settled, which caused an ambiguous attitude 
in taking clear responsibility among the central and local 
governments. Thirdly, for the Kobe case, while there was an 
earthquake resistance design code introduced in 1981, Japan 
had no true comprehensive disaster management plan in 
coordination with local governments as practical first 
responder and voluntary organizations. Lastly, on the basis of 
the lessons learned from the Kobe case, the Japanese 
government focused on a unified disaster management with 
local governments as first responder and utilizing voluntary 
efforts in a better coordinated way. With the second approach 
of the cross case analysis, this study examines the relationship 
among participants with the local government centered 
around. Furthermore, the study also investigates if there is a 
relation between the type of disaster management system and 
the effectiveness of the system during a disaster response 
phase. The following Fig. 5 presents the average proportions 
of each code based on groups. For instance, the proportion 
60% of ACTS_CTGOV in the group 1 came from the average 
of 61% in the same code of Katrina and 58% of Tohoku. 
 
 
Figure 5. Vertical cylinder graphs showing the average of proportions for 
each concept by group 
Firstly, for the concept actors, it is obvious that the 
management systems established previously have no effect 
on the disaster response with the local government centered 
around coordination with the private sector. If the systems of 
group 1 were put into practice efficiently as planned, the 
proportion of the local government and private sector would 
have been taken up more than the proportion of group 2, 
which suggest lack of effectiveness of the management 
systems by group 1. Secondly, as for concepts attitude and 
direction, it is hard to find any efficiency of utilizing the 
management systems by group 1. Even though there is a 
slight improvement in the active attitude by 4%, it is hard to 
  
say that there is a significant difference after setting up the 
management systems. Furthermore, in the direction concept, 
the ratio of the dyadic direction in the group 2 is larger than 
the one of group 1 by 16%. Lastly, for the concept exclusion, 
there is a significant difference between group 1 and group 2. 
While the proportion of the opened network of group 1 is 
62%, only 13% is made up of group 2. It is clear that the 
disaster management systems of group 1 have an influence on 
the network structure and helped the government sector 
flexible to accept relief efforts from outside, such as NGOs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A. Implications of Findings 
In this study we seek to answer question  how does a policy 
network perform in the process of a disaster response?, 
which has been carried out looking for the difference from 
network components (network variables in details) in policy 
network theory and network types following disaster 
response management systems to tackle the question. The 
following TABLE IV presents the results based on the previous 
analyses for the questions raised from the previous section 1. 
 
TABLE IV. RESULTS FOR THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Case Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Katrina The 
government 
sector & the 
private sector  
Local govt. 
was supposed 
to but 
overwhelmed 
One-sided 
and lacked 
of  
communicat
ion 
Closed for 
helps from 
outside, but 
opened 
slightly 
through 
NGOs 
Maemi The 
government 
sector & the 
private sector 
Varied 
according to 
local govt.     
One-side, 
but dyadic 
for some 
local govt. 
Closed, but 
opened 
slightly 
through 
NGOs  
Kobe The 
government 
sector & the 
private sector 
Local govt. 
was expected 
to but 
overwhelmed 
One-sided 
and 
swamped 
with the 
sheer 
number of 
volunteers 
Closed tight 
Tohoku The 
government 
sector & the 
private sector 
& 
international 
relief 
organizations 
Local govt. 
and 
emergency 
headquarter, 
but lacked of 
coordinated 
disaster 
management 
framework 
One-sided 
and did not 
have a clear 
command 
line due to a 
lack of 
leadership 
at the 
political 
level 
Opened 
widely for 
the outside 
help 
The policy network of disaster response management for 
the three cases, i.e. Katrina, Maemi, and Kobe, were formed 
of the most closed network, a  policy community type out of 
five types of policy networks classified by Rhodes and Marsh 
[10]. On the other hand, the policy network of the Tohoku 
case was made up of an open network, an issue network. 
While some scholars argue that the policy community type 
should be considered to increase the efficiency of a disaster 
response management, others argue that the management 
system can be more effective with horizontal relationship 
than vertical because the system becomes more flexible in 
accepting and coordinating with the relief effort from the 
outside as Lee and Park [5] address. For the case of Tohoku, 
while the government was busy downplaying the severity of 
the nuclear threat and defending its stance, the emergency 
relief operations by voluntary organizations were notable, and 
they were busy delivering urgent relief items to the defected 
population. This study argues that the issue network may be 
considered as a better network type to increase the efficiency 
of a disaster response with participation of the private sector. 
 
B. Contributions 
In general, we analyzed the issues on a bureaucratic or 
hierarchical command control approach to disaster response 
management and explored the importance of relationship 
among responding actors in improving the responses. In 
particular, the current status the local governments have been 
examined and compared with four different cases, which led 
to suggesting the importance of the role of a local government 
with volunteers. This study is meaningful in presenting which 
concept is relatively important when a disaster response 
network is formed, and this could give further insight in 
establishing a more effective network for an unexpected and 
complex event.   
 
C. Conclusions 
Various network concepts from the policy network theory 
were investigated to show whether the extent of failures in the 
disaster management can be improved by connecting the 
hierarchical and community based open system, which 
reflects the conclusions from the white paper of the Kobe 
earthquake, the congressional report of the Katrina, and the 
report of the National Diet for the Tohoku earthquake. None 
of the points mentioned from the previous disasters are new 
or unknown as Rubens [51] argues. In other words, the 
problems pointed out in the previous Japanese disaster in 
Kobe can also be found in the hurricane Katrina and the 
Tohoku earthquake. If the points mentioned from each case 
are recursive, then it may mean that they are predictable and 
solvable. The main points on the basis of the previous 
analyses are: (1) a lack of coordination; (2) a lack of 
communication; (3) a lack of leadership; (4) a lack of 
assistance from outside. 
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